The first book on my list is Contending with Christianity's Critics: Answering New Atheists & Other Objectors, edited by Paul Copan and William Lane Craig. I will be reading the 2009 paperback edition (ISBN 978-0805449365). Any page references or what-not will be for that version. It looks like that's the only version there is (aside from the Kindle edition) but for the sake of thoroughness, there you go.
Contending with Christianity's Critics is a compilation of essays written by eighteen different Christian apologists, intended as a response to contemporary criticisms of Christianity. The first essay of the collection was written by William Lane Craig. It is titled "Dawkins's Delusion" and is Craig's critique of "the central argument" of Richard Dawkins's book The God Delusion. For anyone who is interested, the entire essay is available here (and on Amazon too; just click where it says, "Click to LOOK INSIDE!"). I encourage you to read it now, so you know what I'm talking about. It's only four pages long. And since I'll be referring to The God Delusion quite a bit, take note that my page references are for the 2008 First Mariner Books edition (ISBN 978-0618918249).
The Importance of Charitable Interpretation
Before we start, I want to pause for a (quite long) moment to consider a matter of importance for all those who are truly seeking ultimate truth (and something that I hope to guide me as I work my way through this challenge), and that is the duty of charitably interpreting the arguments of one's opponents. In his essay, Craig uses the phrase "charitable interpretation" ("A more charitable interpretation would be…") and I have taken a liking to it. The concept is one I've thought about quite a lot. Previously I've called it "being generous" or "responding to the strongest possible versions of your opponents' arguments", but Charitable Interpretation is a far, far better way to put it (thank you, William Lane Craig, for that), so that's what I will call it from now on.
I submit that in all areas of discourse where there is disagreement, the discussion would be significantly improved by injecting a healthy dose of Charitable Interpretation. I admit that this is only good policy if the goal of the discussion is to find the truth of things. Of course if your goal is just to "win the debate" then by all means use whatever tactics necessary to do so. But if we really care about truth, as I do, and as Craig presumably does, then we should interpret our opponents' arguments charitably.
What Is Charitable Interpretation?
To understand what I mean by Charitable Interpretation, consider the following case. Let us suppose that we are debating someone (the format of the debate is irrelevant; it could be face to face, or in print, as in the case of the Craig/Dawkins one that we are discussing, or any other format). Call this debate opponent Professor X. When Professor X puts forth an argument, we have two choices. If we just want to win the debate, we should start looking for weak points in his argument and quickly list as many of them as we can. The more flaws we can find and point out, even if they are merely superficial or results of our own misinterpretation of Professor X's arguments, the harder it is for poor Professor X to counter all of them, and the more likely we are to "win" the argument. But if we are truly interested in truth, we should proceed in a different way.
First we should try to understand Professor X's argument. A good way to be sure you understand an argument is to be able to repeat the argument yourself in your own words. But not only should we try to understand the argument that Professor X presents, we should also try to understand what Professor X finds so compelling about the argument he is making. We should, in a sense, try to "feel" the force of the argument. So, if the argument is "Premise 1, Premise 2, & Premise 3, therefore Conclusion," we should not merely be able to regurgitate "Premise 1, Premise 2, & Premise 3, therefore Conclusion" (with perhaps different phrasing, i.e. "in our own words"). We should be able to justify the premises (as Professor X might), and spell out the logical and rational connections between and among the three premises and the conclusion. One reason this is important is because people often fail to be as clear as we would like when laying out an argument. For instance, Professor X might leave out a key premise. It is our job to notice this and explicitly identify the missing premise. The goal here is to make Professor X's argument as strong as we can.
We may still disagree. We might think the justification for Premise 2 is a bad one, or that the argument is invalid, but we should know why Professor X thinks otherwise. If we're really interested in having a meaningful debate, this is a great way to start.
Here are some examples of this idea:
Say Professor X's argument is "'if A then B', and 'if C then D', therefore 'if A then D'." If we're the type of people whose only goal is to win the debate, we'll say, "Obviously this is invalid; the premises do not entail the conclusion and we should not waste our time with the argument." But a Charitable Interpretation would be more like this: "Professor X's argument, as stated, is invalid. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. But Professor X is no idiot, so what else could be going on here? Obviously he is missing the premise "if B then C," which strengthens the argument and makes it more plausible and interesting (and, importantly, valid), but still wrong for the following reasons..." And so on.
Or say it is unclear what Professor X means by Premise 1. We shouldn't say, "Professor X fails to make his argument clear. Therefore we can safely ignore his ramblings." We should say, "Premise 1 is unclear. I can see three ways that Professor X might mean it to be interpreted: A, B, and C. On only cursory inspection, A reveals itself to be false. Here is why: yada, yada, yada. B might be true, but if we're careful we can see that the argument would lose its validity on the interpretation of Premise 1 as B (unless we add this other premise 'D', but that has other problems for such and such reasons). But C makes the argument appear much stronger and in order to understand why it still fails, we will need to consider the following: yada, yada, yada."
I think these two examples are enough to show what I mean. Essentially, to abide by the principle of Charitable Interpretation, we should, when confronted with Professor X's argument, not merely accept it at face value and then evaluate it as presented; we should try to shore up any holes in Professor X's argument, explicitly mention any premises that we think might be missing, and try to clarify anything unclear. (By all means, please do involve Professor X in this process if the situation allows. Ask him questions about what he means and so on.) We should do our best to strengthen Professor X's argument as much as possible. Then we can deal with the strongest version (or versions) of what we have charitably interpreted Professor X's argument to be.
It's important to note at this point that the goal of Charitable Interpretation isn't really to aid in understanding what Professor X means. Charitable Interpretation is a tool for truth-seeking, not for debating, so you might come up with and respond to something that Professor X didn't mean at all. And that's fine. If you've done a good job of interpreting an argument charitably, it is no argument against your Charitable Interpretation to say, "That's not what I meant!" Of course you should address what that person actually did say or mean, but your Charitable Interpretation should be a stronger argument, so if you point that out and make the Charitable Interpretation your main focus, any reasonable Professor X won't object.
And also remember that Charitable Interpretation is only for arguments that could be made stronger (due to whatever reason: lack of clarity, invalidity, implausible premises, and so on). In rare cases people actually do make their arguments as strong as they can be to begin with, and in those cases you can just deal with the argument as stated, with no need for Charitable Interpretation.
Ways of "Dealing With" Arguments
I now want to talk about what I mean by "dealing with" arguments, and how it relates to being right or wrong and being convinced by an argument or remaining unmoved by it. You may have noticed that in both of my examples above, we were sure that Professor X was wrong and were able to demonstrate why, and now I'm saying to "deal with" the strongest versions of Professor X's arguments. This might give the impression that my advice on Charitable Interpretation is for the dogmatic or for those only interested in winning debates (and not for those of us who are truly interested in truth).
After all, what more powerful way of winning a debate is there than saying, "Professor X's argument, at face value, is wrong for reasons 1 2 & 3, but even if we interpret it charitably like so, it's still wrong. And here is yet another way we might try to make it stronger, but no, it fails again. So as you can see, as hard as we try to be charitable to poor Professor X, his argument just doesn't work on any level." And sometimes that's exactly how it will go, even if we're being charitable and as honestly truth-seeking as we can. But so far I've left out of my discussion the possibility of occasions when we are wrong and Professor X is right (or maybe just a bit closer to being right than we are, as is more often the case). Trust me, this will happen sometimes. We are fallible humans. We make mistakes.
So, what happens then? It might go a little like this: "All of Professor X's premises are undoubtedly true and deductively imply his conclusion. I must throw in the towel and throw in with Professor X. Not only has he won the debate, he has without qualification won me over to his side." It will likely not go like this, though. This almost never happens, even when everyone involved is being completely intellectually honest.
More likely, it will go like this: "Professor X's argument is wrong. It is logically invalid and thus fails to establish its conclusion. However, if we supply the missing 'Premise 5', and further clarify Premise 3 to be interpreted as Premise 3b, then I think we have something here. Premises 1 through 5 are now true, as far as I can tell, and logically imply a conclusion very similar to but slightly different from Professor X's original conclusion."
Or yet even more likely: "Professor X is wrong. There is no doubt about it. His conclusion does not follow from his premises, no matter how charitably we interpret his argument. However, I must admit that I was also (slightly) wrong (probably). As Professor X's (seemingly true) Premises 1, 2, and 4 show, the position I previously held (position A) looks untenable in light of such and such argument. Thus, I must now seriously consider revising my position to position B, which is very similar to position A, but differs in the following respects: yada, yada, yada. I'm going to have to think about this."
And just one more: "Professor X's (charitably interpreted) argument might be convincing for him, but because I lack the knowledge or experience that would be required to evaluate Premise 2, I cannot conclusively accept or reject it right now. It appears quite thin, but don't take that as my final word just yet. I will get back with you all when I know more about the matter."
As you can see, it is possible to "deal with" Professor X's charitably interpreted arguments by completely rejecting them, or by completely embracing them, or by doing anything number of things on the continuum between these two extremes. By no means do I want to give the impression that Charitable Interpretation means being soft on Professor X's arguments or holding back any criticisms of them that you may have. Absolutely not. Some arguments are just plain awful, and no amount of Charitable Interpretation will change that. On the other hand, I don't want to make Charitable Interpretation seem like a mere debating trick, where you make Professor X's arguments seem especially weak by reinforcing them in a number of ways and then still manage to thoroughly demolish them. As I said, sometimes this will happen. But don't let it happen every time, because it shouldn't. Be open to being convinced you're wrong, because that will happen if you're being honest.
Final Thoughts on Charitable Interpretation
We're almost done with the subject of Charitable Interpretation. I just want to explain (for those to whom it is not clear) why Charitable Interpretation is a good thing for us truth-seekers, then quickly discuss how to overcome the difficult challenge of consistently interpreting charitably, and finally address two human tendencies that might cause us to resist engaging in honest Charitable Interpretation.
So, why is it desirable to engage in Charitable Interpretation, if we are seeking the truth? Think about it this way. There is a fallacy in logic called the straw man fallacy. We have fallen prey to the straw man fallacy when we attack a weaker argument than was presented by our opponent. The fallacy's name comes from the idea that if you are to fight someone, it is unimpressive (to say the least) if you set up a man made of straw and fight that instead. You cannot claim to have bested your opponent if all you fought was a straw man. Likewise, not dealing with the full force of our opponents' arguments, and only refuting weak versions of them, gives us no right to claim we have honestly engaged with our opponent.
Charitable Interpretation can be seen as the opposite of the straw man fallacy. Instead of setting up a man made of straw, we set up an army of killer robots armed with lasers and rocket launchers and other frightening weaponry, all controlled by a rigorously trained team of the world's best first-person shooter gamers. (At least that's the idea; sometimes there is only enough material for a single much less impressive robot.)
In a search for truth, we should proceed in whatever way has the greatest chance of us arriving at the truth of any given matter. It is clear that a poor way of doing this is to adopt the debate-winning-is-all-that-matters attitude and seek any way to destroy an argument, because then we are unlikely to ever change our minds. Charitable Interpretation, as an opposite of the straw man fallacy, allows us to face the strongest of our opponents' arguments every time. That way, we have a much greater chance of finding out that we're wrong (if we are in fact wrong). And that is why we should interpret Professor X's arguments charitably (and everyone else's too).
Charitable Interpretation is hard, though. As I said, sometimes our opponent doesn't provide us with the material to build a team of butt-kicking robots. We have to use our imagination to provide the missing material (if it's there; once again, and for the last time, some arguments just suck and there is no way we can build anything other than a straw man out of them). And since Charitable Interpretation takes this imagination on our part, we can often, due to a lack of imagination, fail to interpret as charitably as we should. This is why dialogue is important in debates. When you respond to Professor X's argument, pay attention to how he responds to you. Interpret that response charitably as well. Repeat ad infinitum, or until you and Professor X eventually agree. The reason to do this is that what Professor X says should help you think of ways that you could have done some Charitable Interpretation but failed to do so.
And now, finally, why might we resist Charitable Interpretation? The first cause of our resistance is that sometimes we don't like certain people to be right (or maybe we just don't like certain people, period). For instance, because I disagree so much with almost everything that William Lane Craig says, I have the tendency to hesitate acknowledging when he says something true (especially when it at first glance appears false). I would much rather find some flaw – any flaw – and point that out, rather than honestly deal with any good points that he makes. And it's even worse with someone like, say, Ray Comfort, whom not only (like Craig) I find to be on the wrong side of most philosophical issues, but also (for the most part unlike Craig) is very unsophisticated in his views and the way he expresses them.
What is the remedy for this problem? I have three suggestions to help with it. First, we can do our best to ignore the people who are making these arguments and just deal with the arguments themselves. After all, an argument should stand or fall based on its own merits, regardless of its source. Second, we can remember that a great deal of the arguments tossed around these days are ancient; the people who use them today for the most part didn't make them up, so being convinced by an argument doesn't necessarily say anything about the person who put the argument to us. And third, if our ego is really so fragile, we can always tell ourselves that it wasn't really Professor X's argument that convinced us – it was our own. We were the ones who interpreted charitably, weren't we? That means that we built the army of killer robots that defeated us, so surely we can take great comfort in that fact.
And the second reason we might resist interpreting charitably is that we simply don't like to admit to being wrong, and if we are honestly practicing Charitable Interpretation, sometimes we will have to admit that we got something wrong. This is not easy to do. But if we truly care about truth, and aren't more invested in protecting our egos and looking like we always know what we're talking about, then we ought to just swallow our pride and admit defeat in such cases.
One cool thing about admitting defeat in philosophy is that whenever you do so, paradoxically you become intellectually stronger rather than weaker, because the argument that convinced you has now become a weapon in your arsenal. So as truth-seekers we are like superheroes who absorb the powers of those who defeat us. I can't think of a better superpower (philosophically speaking, that is).
I am glad I was able to preface this entire blog with those thoughts, because, as I said, Charitable Interpretation is difficult. So there is a good chance I will occasionally (or often, even) fail to interpret charitably. Whenever I do so, please call me out on it. Truth is truly the goal I seek here. With that in mind, let's now see what Dawkins has to say and how Craig responds.
Dawkins's Argument(s)
The God Delusion is a 2006 book in which the author, evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, attempts to convert his readers to atheism. He says so quite explicitly: "If this book works as I intend, religious readers who open it will be atheists when they put it down" (p. 28). Of most concern to us at this point is Chapter 4, titled "Why there almost certainly is no God", because it contains "the central argument" that Craig is responding to in "Dawkins's Delusion".
So, what is this central argument? Dawkins summarizes it at the end of Chapter 4 on pages 188-189 as follows:
1. One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect, over the centuries, has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises.
2. The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself. In the case of a man-made artefact such as a watch, the designer really was an intelligent engineer. It is tempting to apply the same logic to an eye or a wing, a spider or a person.
3. The temptation is a false one, because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer. The whole problem we started out with was the problem of explaining statistical improbability. It is obviously no solution to postulate something even more improbable. We need a 'crane', not a 'skyhook', for only a crane can do the business of working up gradually and plausibly from simplicity to otherwise improbable complexity.
4. The most ingenious and powerful crane so far discovered is Darwinian evolution by natural selection. Darwin and his successors have shown how living creatures, with their spectacular statistical improbability and appearance of design, have evolved by slow, gradual degrees from simple beginnings. We can now safely say that the illusion of design in living creatures is just that – an illusion.
5. We don't yet have an equivalent crane for physics. Some kind of multiverse theory could in principle do for physics the same explanatory work as Darwinism does for biology. This kind of explanation is superficially less satisfying than the biological version of Darwinism, because it makes heavier demands on luck. But the anthropic principle entitles us to postulate far more luck than our limited human intuition is comfortable with.
6. We should not give up hope of a better crane arising in physics, something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology. But even in the absence of a strongly satisfying crane to match the biological one, the relatively weak cranes we have at present are, when abetted by the anthropic principle, self-evidently better than the self-defeating skyhook hypothesis of an intelligent designer.
If the argument of this chapter is accepted, the factual premise of religion – the God Hypothesis – is untenable. God almost certainly does not exist.
Let's admit straight away that if this is supposed to be taken as an argument against God's existence, it is pretty terrible. The conclusion certainly does not follow from the "premises". All that Craig has to do to refute the "argument" is point out this simple fact, which he does. So that's that. Craig wins and we can move on to the next essay. Right?
No. We're here to seek truth, not to see who can beat whom in a debate between William Lane Craig and Richard Dawkins. And the best way to seek truth, if you recall, is to put on our Charitable Interpretation glasses and take a good hard look at all of the arguments involved. First I'll try to charitably interpret Dawkins, and then I'll do the same to Craig's response, then I'll see if I can on my own come up with some objections to my charitable interpretation of Dawkins, and then we'll see where things stand. Onto Dawkins!
The first thing I'd like to point out regarding Dawkins's argument is that the two pages I reproduced above are just that—merely two pages of a four hundred-something page book. Dawkins's own summary of his argument might be terrible, but maybe what he's summarizing is expressed better in other parts of the book.
After a thorough reading (and re-reading) of The God Delusion, particularly Chapter 4, I was able to distill four separate relevant arguments that Dawkins may have meant. Unfortunately, Dawkins never explicitly states three of these four arguments, so my Charitable Interpretations are mostly guesses at what he means, but I think they are pretty good guesses. The first two arguments are attempts to refute the design argument for the existence of God, and the second two are arguments trying to show that God is very unlikely and "almost certainly does not exist". I am going to lay all four arguments out on the table before considering objections (from Craig or from anyone else) to any of them.
Dawkins's First Argument
Let's begin with the argument that Dawkins makes most explicitly. Here it is in his words (from the bottom of page 146): "Creationist 'logic' is always the same. Some natural phenomenon is too statistically improbable, too complex, too beautiful, too awe-inspiring to have come into existence by chance. Design is the only alternative to chance that the authors can imagine. Therefore a designer must have done it. And science's answer to this faulty logic is also always the same. Design is not the only alternative to chance. Natural selection is a better alternative."
As I said, this argument is only trying to refute a certain argument for the existence of God. Dawkins is not yet making the attempt to convince us that God doesn't exist. Here again is the argument he's trying to refute, stated more formally:
1. There exists some natural phenomenon that is too statistically improbable (or too beautiful or awe-inspiring or whatever) to have come about by chance.
2. The only two types of causes that can bring things about are chance and design.
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), the phenomenon mentioned in premise 1 must be the result of design. We call the designer "God". So, God exists.
Historically, several phenomena have been used in this argument as examples of statistical improbability that need accounting for. They include (but are not necessarily limited to): Earth's life-friendly properties, the complexity of certain biological organs, the existence of life generally, and the life-friendly properties of our universe at a fundamental level.
Some things that one might use as examples of improbability would clearly keep the argument valid, but not warrant the bold conclusion that "God exists", even if both premises are accepted. For example, my computer is too statistically improbable to have come about by chance, but no one would claim that because we know the computer has a designer we must call that designer "God". Thus, the argument can only ever prove a stipulatively defined "God". But that doesn't mean it's necessarily a bad argument, because the stipulative definition can in some instances be close enough to a traditional definition of God to be noteworthy. For instance, if one uses our universe as an example of improbability for premise 1, then the God proved in the conclusion would be "the designer of our universe". I'd say that's God-like enough for the argument to matter, if it's sound.
The first response from Dawkins that we'll consider (which I will henceforth refer to as DA1, short for 'Dawkins's Argument 1') is to reject premise 2. He claims with confidence that chance and design are not the only two ways something might come about. Natural selection brings things into existence, and natural selection is neither chance nor design. Therefore, premise 2 is clearly false and the argument cannot be sound.
(As an aside, notice that contrary to Dawkins's assertions there is no problem with the logic of this version of the design argument. It is a valid argument. Any attempt to refute it must be by rejecting one or more premises. The logic is fine. Dawkins frequently displays this sort of disappointing carelessness throughout his book. This is a sad fall from the unrelenting precision, clarity, and care that was taken in writing The Selfish Gene.)
Dawkins's Second Argument (DA2)
Dawkins's second response to the design argument is to reply, "Who designed the designer?" As commonly understood, this is a very bad argument. The common understanding of this reply goes something along these lines: "God is not a good explanation for [insert phenomenon here] because you don't also have an explanation for God. I won't believe there's a designer until you can tell me who designed that designer." The reason this argument is problematic is that it seems to assume that in order for an explanation to be a good one, we need to explain the explanation too. If this were true, we could never explain everything because every attempt to explain anything would result in an infinite regress of more needed explanations. Since we can genuinely explain things (neither Dawkins nor Craig would disagree here; nor would I, for that matter), this interpretation of the "who designed the designer?" response is clearly unsound.
But I think this is not how DA2 is generally intended. I may be going out on a limb here, but I think that most people who use the DA2 response (including Dawkins) may phrase it in the above, unsound, manner but intuitively realize it can be a powerful response if only it's understood properly. The problem is, most people who use it as a response haven't thought about it enough to explain it any other way than the way that obviously fails to be a convincing argument.
The way that I think most proponents of the DA2 response intuitively intend it is as a reductio ad absurdum argument. It is another response to the design argument for God, so I'll reproduce that again here:
1. There exists some natural phenomenon that is too statistically improbable to have come about by chance.
2. The only two types of causes that can bring things about are chance and design.
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), the phenomenon mentioned in premise 1 must be the result of design. We call the designer "God". So, God exists.
DA2 tries to show that this argument can't be sound because, if accepted, it would imply another unstated conclusion that we simply cannot accept. Here is the rest of the argument proving as much:
4. Any mind capable of designing anything would be too statistically improbable to have come about by chance.
5. Therefore (from 3 and 4), God is too statistically improbable to have come about by chance.
6. Therefore (from 2 and 5), God must be the result of design. We call the designer God_2. So, God_2 exists.
7. Further applications of premises 4 and 2 result in a God_3, a God_4, and so on until we have an infinite proliferation of complex Gods. This is impossible. At least one of this argument's premises must be false, and so this argument cannot be sound.
It might not be immediately obvious how this is, in fact, the "who designed the designer?" argument. The following dialogue should help to illustrate how this is so:
Atheist: (after the theist puts forth the design argument) "Okay, let's say that you have
proven God exists. So then who designed God?"
Theist: "What do you mean? No one designed God. God is the first cause of
everything else."
Atheist: "But you said that anything too statistically improbable to have come about by
chance must be the result of design, right?"
Theist: "Right…"
Atheist: "And if God exists, then he's got to be staggeringly complex, right? After all, he
designed the entire universe. Any mind capable of doing that must be at least
as improbable as the universe itself."
Theist: "Well, actually—"
Atheist: "So God himself must have a designer too, if your argument holds water. And
that would mean God's designer also has a designer, and so does that
designer, and so on forever and ever."
Theist: "If I could just get a word in—"
Atheist: "But that can't be true! You would certainly agree with me on that. There isn't
an infinity of designer Gods. And since your original argument implies there is,
it can't be right."
Theist: "I never actually said—"
Atheist: "So I guess you were wrong all along, and I was right! Neener-neener-neener!"
Something important to note is the fact that the absurd conclusion doesn't follow from the original design argument without a little help. It is necessary to include premise 4 if one wants to make this argument validly. But that means that it won't be convincing to any theist who doesn't accept premise 4. This will come up again when we get to Craig's responses, so I won't discuss it here any further.
Cranes and Skyhooks
You may have noticed that in Dawkins's summary of his "central argument" above, he uses the terms 'crane' and 'skyhook'. Before we move on to Dawkins's two anti-God arguments, I'd like to take a moment to talk about what these terms mean.
The terms 'crane' and 'skyhook' were introduced in Daniel Dennett's book Darwin's Dangerous Idea. From Wikipedia: "Dennett uses the term 'skyhook' to describe a source of design complexity that does not build on lower, simpler layers—in simple terms, a miracle. Dennett contrasts theories of complexity that require such miracles with those based on 'cranes', structures which permit the construction of entities of greater complexity but which are themselves founded solidly 'on the ground' of physical science." If you want to lift something, don't go looking for a skyhook to do the job, for the simple reason that there can be no skyhooks; a skyhook itself would need to be supported by something, and thus wouldn't be a true skyhook. There are no skyhooks for the same reason that it is impossible for you to lift yourself by your own bootstraps. The only type of "hook" capable of doing real lifting is a crane, of which some part must stand firmly on the ground.
"The ground" is statistical probability. As we rise into the air, away from the ground, things become more statistically improbable. A crane is capable of standing on the ground (or on a structure built by other cranes) and lifting materials higher into this "Design Space" (to use another of Dennett's terms) and building structures higher up (more improbable) than the ground on which the crane rests. New, higher cranes can be built on the new structures, and they can lift even higher into Design Space. This can result in a structure of astonishing height (improbability) that started out very small and un-improbable. Natural selection is the most famous example of a crane, probably because it is the concept that the term 'crane' was coined to elucidate. To quote Dawkins: "Natural selection is the champion crane of all time. It has lifted life from primeval simplicity to the dizzy heights of complexity, beauty and apparent design that dazzle us today" (p. 99).
A skyhook, on the other hand, rests on nothing and yet is still capable of doing the work of lifting things high into Design Space. In other words, a skyhook is any source of complexity/improbability that is itself complex/improbable but is also causally unsupported by anything (other than perhaps random chance). A skyhook is not merely something uncaused or randomly caused. It is something both uncaused or randomly caused and improbable. The ground of Design Space is an uncaused cause but isn't a skyhook because it is not improbable.
Now, because I haven't actually read Darwin's Dangerous Idea, I am not certain my explanation of the terms "crane" and "skyhook" is entirely correct. Thus, I'll use them sparingly and will not make any actual arguments using them. I will only use them after the fact, in an attempt to make the arguments more intuitive.
Dawkins's Third Argument (DA3)
The final two arguments I have gleaned from The God Delusion are more atheistic than the first two in that they are not simply rebutting a theistic argument for the existence of God, but trying to make a positive case for the conclusion that "God almost certainly does not exist."
The first of these two is the argument that God, traditionally defined as the intelligent "first cause" of our universe and everything in it, is unlikely in the extreme to exist, by definition. Here is the argument:
1. Statistically improbable complexity demands causal explanation, and by definition almost certainly has as its cause something other than chance.
2. God (if he exists) must be improbably complex to do the things he does (for example simply to be intelligent).
3. There exists nothing causally prior to God (if he exists). That is to say, God is the "first cause".
4. Therefore (from 1 and 2), God (if he exists) demands a causal explanation. He almost certainly has a cause that is something other than chance.
5. Therefore (from 3 and 4), God almost certainly does not exist.
In skyhook-speak, premise 1 says that skyhooks (almost certainly) don't exist. Premises 2 and 3 define God as a skyhook: he is high up in Design Space (premise 2) and yet unsupported by cranes or crane-built structures (premise 3). Thus, such a skyhook-God doesn't exist.
Again, problems with the argument will wait until we've gone over at all four, because some objections apply to more than just one argument. So let's take a look at the last one then, shall we?
Dawkins's Fourth Argument (DA4)
This final argument is probably the least explicitly stated of the four, so maybe Dawkins didn't intend to make the argument at all, but in any case I don't want to leave it out. We don't want to leave any stones unturned, right? Here goes:
1. Intelligence, rather than being found as the cause of all complex things, is in all known cases a late-comer to the universe and results from a long process of non-intelligent, simple causes (specifically natural selection).
2. Therefore, by analogy (from 1), it is most likely that any other heretofore unknown intelligent beings will have similarly arrived late to the universe and ultimately result from non-intelligent simplicity.
3. Such an intelligence could not be God (by definition).
4. Therefore (from 2 and 3), God most likely doesn't exist.
Cranes for Physics and the Anthropic Principle
Before we look at objections to these four arguments, I want to mention one point of difference between Dawkins's summary of his central "argument" and the four arguments I laid out above. In premises 5 and 6 of Dawkins's summary, there is talk of "the anthropic principle" and of the hope of eventually discovering cranes that might explain physics (multiverse theory is mentioned as a possibility). These topics are conspicuously absent from all four the above arguments. I left them out because I think they're unnecessary to the main points of Dawkins's arguments. It seems that he only mentions them in order to sketch out what the chain of explanatory causes stretching from us and our present universe back to its ultimate origins might plausibly look like without God. In other words, Dawkins is trying to make his arguments go down easier by showing that the non-existence of God is possible. While these topics are both interesting and worth discussing, I simply don't want to take the time here to do them justice, so I promise I will bring them up again in a later post.
Craig's Response
Finally we get to hear what Craig has to say. To start that off, I want to point out two problems I have with Craig's short essay. Both problems are instances of Craig failing to interpret Dawkins charitably.
First, he treats Dawkins's central argument as though it is completely separate from the rest of The God Delusion, and that everything else in the book stands or falls based on the one (or four) argument(s). He says, "If this argument fails, then Dawkins's book is hollow at its core." Craig fails to view the argument in context of the rest of the book. For instance, he says "Maybe we should believe in God on the basis of the cosmological argument or the ontological argument or the moral argument," completely ignoring Chapter 3, in which Dawkins responds to exactly those arguments as well as others. I'm not saying that Dawkins's responses to these arguments succeed in refuting them, nor am I saying that they fail; I'm just saying that Craig ignores them. This point isn't too important since Dawkins's other arguments aren't at issue here, but I had to point this out because Craig didn't. We will get to those arguments another day.
The second problem I have with Craig is that he doesn't even do full justice to Dawkins's summary of the "central argument". Take another look at Dawkins's summary above. Compare it to Craig's summary (of the summary):
1. One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises.
2. The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself.
3. The temptation is a false one because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer.
4. The most ingenious and powerful explanation is Darwinian evolution by natural selection.
5. We don't have an equivalent explanation for physics.
6. We should not give up the hope of a better explanation arising in physics, something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology.
Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist.
As you can see, there's a bit more to the summary than Craig would have us believe.
Neither of these problems is ultimately a big deal, because we can go back to The God Delusion itself and see what it really has to say. Mostly I point them out because I disagree so much with Craig and want to make him look bad (which is a completely different thing from wanting to make his arguments look weaker than they really are), but also it is a good opportunity to again stress the importance of interpreting charitably.
Interpret charitably!
The Central Argument Is Invalid
Craig's first response to Dawkins's summary is to rightly point out that it is not a valid argument. Clearly I agree, since I stated as much above. But does the objection still apply to the four charitably interpreted versions of Dawkins's argument?
DA1 is certainly a valid response to the specific version of the design argument that it sets out to refute. There is nothing further to say here.
DA2 validly deduces the infinite regress of Gods. The only question here is whether such a proliferation of deities is in fact impossible. But if necessary we could state the impossibility of it as a separate premise in order to rescue the argument's validity. And I don't think you'd find much opposition from theists to the added premise.
DA3 is also valid.
DA4 is the trickiest of the four in this regard. The conclusion validly follows from premises 2 and 3, but premise 2 is supposed to follow from premise 1, and that's the tricky bit. Premise 2 certainly doesn't follow deductively from 1. It's an inductive inference. Whether it is in fact a good inference isn't particularly important, for reasons we'll see in a moment. I'll address DA4 further down.
The Central Argument Responds only to the Design Argument
Craig's second response is to say that, "At most all that follows is that we should not infer God's existence on the basis of the appearance of design in the universe."
While it's true that DA1 and DA2 are only responses to one particular version of the design argument, DA3 and DA4 evade this criticism by virtue of genuinely arguing for the nonexistence of God.
Explanations of Explanations are Unnecessary
As I already explained, this is a good response to the common interpretation of DA2, but not to my interpretation of DA2.
One might also try this response to DA3, but doing so would demonstrate a misunderstanding of what I mean by DA3. When premise 1 says that complexity demands explanation, it doesn't mean we need to know what that explanation is. It just means we know there has to be an explanation; we might never discover what it is.
Also, the whole problem with continually demanding explanations is that it leads to an infinite regress. DA3 can end the regress by finding a simple explanation of something complex, because only complex explanations require further explanation.
God Can Be Simple
This is Craig's big one. If God really can be simple, then DA4 loses a lot of plausibility and DA2 and DA3 fail outright. Premise 4 of DA2 and premise 2 of DA3 require God to be complex for the arguments to work.
But can God be simple? Craig claims that God is the best explanation of our universe's improbable complexity, and that God himself is not complex, thus being (in Craig's words) "an advance in simplicity." My gut tells me it is ridiculous to think that an intelligent and conscious mind can be anything other than complex. Craig disagrees. He calls God "startlingly simple", "incredibly simple", "remarkably simple" (twice!), and in a footnote, "extraordinarily simple". How can that possibly be so? Because God is "an unembodied mind" and "not composed of parts". Forgive me if I'm wrong, but I don't think that's possible. Craig says that Dawkins is confusing a mind's ideas with the mind itself. Apparently, complex ideas can be had by a simple mind. Again, I don't think that's possible. It seems to me that any mind capable of having even simple ideas must be quite complex. Admittedly my thoughts on the matter are nebulous and uninformed, so at present I can't comment much further. I do not want to dodge the issue entirely, however, so I promise to discuss it in a future post (I'm hoping it will come up in some of the other books on my list, perhaps even Craig's book Reasonable Faith, but if doesn't naturally come up again, I will make it a point to bring it up myself.)
Other Possible Objections
That's it as far as Craig's responses go, but in the interest of charitable interpretation, what follows is a list and discussion of five other possible criticisms of the four arguments.
God Can Be Caused
Premise 3 of DA3 defines God as an uncaused first cause (premise 3 of DA4 seems to do so as well). Most theists don't waver from this, but doing so would successfully protect their theism from DA3 and DA4 (if they think it needs the protection; I doubt many do). What would that entail, though? What it would mean is that they admit God is improbably complex and thus requires causal explanation, but they think that such a God (even if he is just an alien or group of aliens from another universe) is still God-like enough to warrant the label "God" (and be worshipped and all that).
Since theists would almost universally reject this objection, I don't think I'll worry about it too much. I mention it only to be thorough.
Dawkins's Design Argument Is a Bad One
The argument that Dawkins sets up to refute with DA1 and DA2 is not the strongest version of the design argument. In fact it's one of the weakest versions that I've ever seen. So even if DA1 and DA2 succeed, that should not be viewed as a good reason to ignore any further design arguments that may cross our path.
I won't go into those other variations on the design argument here, but when they come up in future readings I will do my best to do them justice.
God Designed Himself
DA2 concludes that God must himself be designed, and so must his designer and his designer's designer and so on, but it ignores the possibility that God's designer is himself. This would stop the infinite regress. Is it even a possibility, though? I don't know, but it's something to consider. God might be self-caused. I don't think I've ever heard a theist argue that. Usually they say that God is uncaused. In any case, I'm not too worried because I don't have any investment in DA2 being a good argument. DA1 works just fine for me.
The Universe's Origins Don't Need to Follow the Universe's Laws
Premise 4 of DA2, premise 1 of DA3, and premise 2 of DA4 all take something that is true (or supposedly true) of objects, events, and/or causes of objects or events within our universe and then try to apply it to the supposed origins of our universe (i.e. God). This objection responds by pointing out we have no justification for doing so. The origin or cause of our universe and its laws might be completely alien to anything we're familiar with. How can we possibly know otherwise?
In skyhook-speak, the origin/cause of Design Space doesn't have to follow the rules of Design Space. For instance, if God is in fact the creator, then he created Design Space itself and doesn't have to subject himself to its rules. In that sense, he's neither a skyhook nor a crane. He's something completely and fundamentally other.
I can sympathize a lot with this objection, but I don't think of it as being very theistic. Far from strengthening the theist's cause, it seems to undermine it by making our universe's ultimate origins a great big question mark. So, since I'm most interested in things that might change my mind, I don't think it's necessary to pursue this objection any further.
DA4 Doesn't Disprove God if We Already Believe He Exists
This is true. DA4 is an inductive argument that only has any force at all if you already don't believe in God. It will probably not convert any theists to atheism because if you have any reason to think that God exists, then you have reason to think premise 1 is false. Premise 1 assumes we don't know God exists, and could therefore be seen as an instance of Begging the Question. And even then, the inference of premise 2 from premise 1 is shaky.
I don't care much for DA4.
Conclusion
So after all that, where do the first arguments stand? I don't like DA4, as you can see. DA2 and DA3 aren't that impressive either, because they assume God must be complex, which many theists would deny, so it's not going to convince them.
DA1 is the best argument of the four, but it's only arguing against one particular (weak) version of one particular argument for the existence of God. It is not by itself going to convert any thoughtful person anytime soon.
Overall, Dawkins has given a fairly weak showing so far in what we've covered of The God Delusion. For what it's worth, though, I really like Chapter 6, which attempts to outline one possible origin of our moral sense. Give it a read if that's something you think might be interested in.
And what's the upshot of all this? First, I want to remind you that as a Charitable Interpretation-advocating truth-seeker, I'm not particularly interested in whether it was Craig or Dawkins who "won the debate." I'm interested in whether this changes my mind on anything. And it doesn't. I was an atheist going in and I still am. Not that I expected that a single four page rebuttal to one (or four) particular atheistic argument(s) would convert me. And I don't think anyone else would either, least of all William Lane Craig.
But it did deepen my understanding of a small part of the philosophy of religion, which is something I said I hoped would happen. And it raised some topics of interest, regarding which I might possibly have a change of mind after further future consideration. These are all topics I promise to bring up again in the future. Even if none of the books on the list discuss them, I'll seek them out. I'll end this post with a list of these four topics:
1. Other design arguments, which I will give the full Charitable Interpretation treatment.
2. The anthropic principle.
3. The possibility of a simple divine mind.
4. Multiverse theory, and other possible cranes to explain physics. In other words, alternatives to God.
